Commissions délibératives : réflexions sur le processus de vote

La fin d’une Commission délibérative est marquée par un vote des parlementaires et des citoyens sur les recommandations qui ont été produites. Au fil des expériences bruxelloises et wallonnes des Commissions délibératives, cette procédure de vote continue de faire débat.

L’intention des fondateurs bruxellois des Commissions délibératives était de permettre un vote identique et public des parlementaires et des citoyens. Cependant certains constitutionnalistes craignaient de faire voter des citoyens de la même manière que des élus dans l’enseinte d’une assemblée. Ils ont donc imaginé une procédure pour redonner du pouvoir au vote des citoyens tout en ne les faisant pas voter comme les élus :

1. Les citoyens votent à bulletin secret ;
2. Le résultat du vote des citoyens est annoncé ;
3. Les parlementaires votent de façon publique en connaissance du résultat du vote des citoyens ;
4. Les députés doivent se justifier si la majorité des votes des parlementaires diverge de ceux des citoyens. 

Avec cette procédure, même si les parlementaires ont en quelque sorte le dernier mot, ils reçoivent de la part des citoyens une saine pression qui vise à orienter leur vote.

Since then, the reluctance of constitutionalists seems to have changed, and serious consideration is being given in Brussels to having elected representatives and citizens vote in the same way, in public. There would be no problem in giving citizens the same vote, since the system would be consultative in any case.

Wallonia’s first Deliberative Committee, which focused on the topic of citizen participation, had the opportunity to debate the issue of voting. Its reflections were interesting, to say the least. The arguments exchanged by the participants qualify the Brussels aspiration for a public vote for both elected representatives and citizens. A significant proportion of the citizen participants expressed reservations about their vote being public.

Unlike elected representatives who are accountable, citizens are not a priori public figures. On sensitive issues, some participants said, it would be tricky to ask citizens drawn by lot to give their opinion publicly, without fearing outside pressure or impact on their private lives. Although they were in favour of equal voting rights for MPs and citizens, the difficulty of a public vote for the unelected led them to abandon this proposal.

To achieve equality of voting between citizens and elected representatives without exposing citizens, Dreamocracy proposes a third way: to have elected representatives and citizens vote in the same way, but by secret ballot. This is what was done by the Irish Constitutional Convention.

The secret ballot also has another advantage for MEPs: it reduces the pressure of party discipline, which could hamper the freedom of their vote. Within the Brussels deliberative committees, this party discipline was particularly visible during the voting phases: « co-construction disappears because the MEPs vote along party lines », reports a public official in charge of the system.

The secret ballot at the end of the process practised by the Irish Constitutional Convention may be part of the answer. If the deliberation has changed the opinion of the elected representatives on a subject and it differs from the position defended by their party, the deputies can thus vote more freely according to their own convictions.